Supreme Court preview

Here's your fun fact for the day:  if Manhattan had the same population density as Alaska, 28 people would live there. 

That comes courtesy of the petition for certiorari of Jim Sturgeon in Sturgeon v. United States, and you get the idea that Sturgeon's lawyers put in the factoid to spice up an otherwise dry topic:  the proper interpretation of the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, and whether it permits the National Park Service to prohibit Sturgeon from using a hovercraft to hunt moose.

No, I am not making that up.

Here's a look at other criminal cases up for review so far by the Supreme Court in its 2018 term:

Timbs v. Indiana.  Timbs pled guilty to drug charges and was placed on probation, but the real punishment was the forfeiture of his 2012 Land Rover.  No, the State didn't grab it because it was the fruit of Timbs' crimes -- he got the $42,000 to pay for it from the proceeds of his father's life insurance policy -- it was because he used it to transport drugs.  That was a bit stiff for the appellate court, which found that the seizure was "grossly disproportionate" to the offense and thus violated the "excessive fines" portion of the Eighth Amendment.  The state supreme court reversed, noting that SCOTUS had never ruled that the excessive fines clause applies to the states.   We'll see if SCOTUS decides that it does.  Given all the criticism of forfeiture abuse, including by Justice Thomas in Leonard v. Texas, a successful outcome for Timbs would not be a surprise.

Stokeling v. U.S., Stitt v. U.S., and Sims v. U.S.  For federal practitioners only.  The Armed Career Criminal Act imposes an additional fifteen-year sentence for defendants using a gun in a crime and having three prior drug trafficking offenses or violent felonies.  That normally requires determining what constitutes a "violent felony" under state laws, which in turn requires using the "categorical" approach, in determining what the "generic" elements of common-law crimes like robbery and burglary.  If you're not sure what that means -- and who would be? -- Stokeling will answer the question for robbery, and Stitt and Sims will answer it for burglary.

Garza v. Idaho.  Garza pled guilty to several offenses, but insisted that his lawyer appeal.  The lawyer didn't, because Garza had signed an appeal waiver.  Back in 2000, in Roe v. Flores-Ortega, the Court held that a lawyer who disregarded his client's instruction to file a notice of appeal had performed deficiently, and the defendant should be "presumed" to have been prejudiced.  Eight circuits have applied that rule even where there is an appeal waiver, but the Idaho courts followed the two circuits which haven't:  they require a defendant to show prejudice by identifying the "non-frivolous" arguments they would raise on appeal.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve that split.

Gundy v. U.S.  When Congress passed the latest sex offender registration law, it delegated to the Attorney General the authority to set sex offender regulations, including whether those laws should be applied retroactively.  Gundy argues that this is an unconstitutional delegation of Congress' power; the last time that argument was successfully made was in 1935.  But the delegation of authority to an agency is called the Chevron doctrine, and that's been under attack recently.  Conservatives, including hard-charging party-goer Brett Kavanaugh, have complained for years that it gives too much power to the executive.

Gamble v. U.S.  Those who remember the Rodney King trials know of the "dual sovereignty" exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause:  you can be prosecuted by both the Feds and the state for the same crime.  In fact, if you kidnap someone in Tennessee and take them to Ohio and kill them, you can be prosecuted for both kidnapping and murder in each state.  This is another one where the defendant's arguments might be persuasive to the conservatives on the court:  there's nothing in the text of the clause that supports the dual sovereignty concept.

There are a couple of death penalty cases on tap, too, which present the growing absurdity of the punishment, especially in light of the extensive delays in capital cases.  One is Madison v. Alabama, which was argued last week, and which we'll talk about in detail on Friday.  That case presents the issue of whether Madison's dementia precludes him from being executed for killing a police officer 30 years ago.  Bucklew v. Precythe presents a truly unusual situation.  Bucklew does not contest his 1998 conviction for rape and murder, nor does he challenge his death sentence.  Rather, he contends that his unusual medical condition - cavernous hemangioma, present in only .002% of the population - causes inoperable, blood-filled tumors to grow in his throat and around his face, head, and neck, and would make death by lethal injection excruciatingly painful.  He wants to be electrocuted instead. 

Finally, hunting is apparently A Thing for the Court this year.  Here's the question presented in Herrera v. Wyoming:

Did Wyoming's admission as a state, or the statutory establishment of the Bighorn National Forest, abrogate the Crow Tribe's 1868 federal treaty right to hunt on "unoccupied lands of the United States," thereby permitting the criminal conviction of Clayvin Herrera, a Crow Tribe member, who was allegedly engaged in subsistence hunting for his family?

If you see another post on this blog about this case, call the police, because it means I've been kidnapped and somebody else is doing this.

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