Three from SCOTUS
So for weeks I don't have any Supreme Court decisions to
talk about, which is sort of like being a baseball writer in January. But spring training has started, so you can
begin your day by reading about how well the Indians are going to manage with
one of the best defensive outfields in baseball but one in which the three
players may not hit double figures in home runs -- combined -- or whether the
Reds idea of making newly-acquired Shin Soo Choo their regular centerfielder is
a good idea, considering that he's played the position exactly once since
2006. And then you can come here and find
out what Breyer thinks about plain error, or how Teague v. Lane prevents non-citizen defendants who weren't properly
advised of the immigration consequences of their plea and whose convictions
have become final from making ineffective assistance claims under Padilla v. Kentucky.
Frankly, I find the Choo question more interesting; I'm not
sure of his fielding ability, but the guy can swing the stick; his OPS+
is about the same as Josh Hamilton's over the past two years. But reading legal
cases and explaining them is what you guys pay me the big bucks to do, so let's
get to it.
If Supreme Court cases were songs, Evans
v. Michigan would be "With a Little Help from my Friends." Evans' friend turned out to be the judge; at
the close of Evans' arson trial, the judge entered a directed verdict of
acquittal because, in his view, the state hadn't proved a particular
element. Turns out the element wasn't
required at all, and the Michigan court reversed and remanded for a new
trial. No, you don't, said the Supreme
Court in an 8-1 decision: an acquittal
creates a double jeopardy bar to retrial, even if it's premised on an erroneous
ruling by the trial court. The key here
is distinguishing between procedural rulings that might terminate a case, like
declaring a mistrial because of the State's discovery violation, and an
acquittal, which is substantive, even if it is based on something like an
erroneous decision to exclude evidence. A
little twist here: under Ohio law, a
judgment of acquittal under CrimR 29(C), which allows the judge to override a
jury's guilty verdict and acquit the defendant, also creates a double jeopardy
bar and isn't appealable. That's not
true of acquittals in Federal court under the similar Rule 29(c); the Supreme
Court has held that appeal and reversal of the judge's ruling isn't barred by
double jeopardy, because if the appeal is successful, all that happens is that
the jury's verdict is reinstated.
If Supreme Court cases were books, Johnson
v. Williams would be sequel number 37, where you'd know the ending as
soon as you opened the first page; the case demonstrates (again) why it's so
hard to win habeas claims. As any
appellate lawyer can tell you, the more deferential the standard of review, the
more likely the lower court decision will be affirmed. Back in 1996 Congress passed a law tightening
up habeas review; among other things, it provided that once a state court had
addressed a federal claim (like ineffective assistance of counsel) on the
merits, the federal court couldn't grant habeas unless the state court decision
was contrary establish US Supreme Court, or it had made an "unreasonable
determination of the facts." (And don't
even get me started on what a defendant has to do to show the state court's
determination is "unreasonable.")
Of course, if the state court doesn't address the federal question on the merits, then its
decision on that isn't due any deference, and the federal courts review it de novo.
That's what Williams claimed; the state court had rejected his claim
that the judge had erred in kicking off a juror during deliberations, but hadn't
specifically addressed the federal aspect of that claim. No matter, says a unanimous court. Last year in Harrington v. Richter the court held that where the state court
rejects a defendant's claim without any discussion, the defendant has to rebut
the presumption that the federal claim was in fact adjudicated on the
merits. The Williams Court decides that if complete silence merits a
presumption, so does silence on the federal issue.
There's some merit to the argument -- in many cases, such as
ineffective assistance, the state law is based on federal law, so discussion of
one solves the other. And the presumption
is rebuttable; for example, say, if the state court had addressed only a state
claim that the judge had abused his discretion in removing the juror, it would
be hard to argue that the state court had made a merits determination of the
federal claim. But the main lesson here
for practitioners is not to take up habeas work if you've self-esteem issues.
Comments