The saga of State v. Crager comes to a conclusion. Sort of. For those late to the party, the Supreme Court held in Crager that testimony by a DNA analyst who wasn’t the one who actually performed the test didn’t violate the defendant’s confrontation rights, because scientific tests weren’t testimonial under Crawford v. Washington. This past summer, in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, the US Supreme Court held that they were. SCOTUS also remanded Crager back to the Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Melendez-Diaz.
My post a month ago (which has links to previous posts discussing the two decisions) suggested how the Ohio Supreme Court might handle this. “Punting it back to the trial court” wasn’t one of the options I foresaw, but last week, that’s exactly what the court did, deciding to let the trial court “address the admissibility of the DNA evidence admitted at the trial in light of the holding in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts.”
What’s to address? The facts aren’t in dispute; it’s purely a question of law, and one which should be addressed by the highest court of the state. The court did the same thing in 2007, in State v. Oliver (discussed here), where the court considered SCOTUS’ decision in Michigan v. Hudson, which had held that the exclusionary rule didn’t apply to violations of the “knock and announce” rule. Despite determining that because “the people of Ohio have a paramount interest in knowing how their courts will interpret and apply Hudson, we have a duty to see that Hudson is addressed as expeditiously as possible,” the court remanded the case back to the trial court to “reconsider its ruling in light of Hudson.” So what happened? The defendant pled out, got six months in jail, and almost three years later there’s still no definitive ruling on Hudson’s application.
The appellate courts did actually address some issues, so let’s take a look at those… (keep reading…)