Case Update
Perhaps the most interesting decision out of the Supreme Court this past week, Ahmad v. AK Steel Corp., was one it didn’t make. Eighteen months after the appeal had been filed, fifteen months after the court had accepted it, ten month after the briefs had been completed, and seven months after oral argument, the Court decided that it had been wrong to accept the case in the first place, and dismissed it as “improvidently allowed.”
Ahmad involved the question of what effect the violation of an administrative regulation — here, an Ohio Building Code requirement of stair handrails — had on the open and obvious doctrine. The dismissal provoked an eight-page dissent from Justice O’Donnell and Justice Lundberg Stratton, who concluded that the open and obvious doctrine should apply to building code violations which are themselves open and obvious, such as the lack of a handrail. The dissent in turn provoked a blistering five-page concurrence by four of the other justices, noting that there was no evidence that the lack of a handrail here did violate any codes, concluding pointedly that “there is no wisdom or common sense” in deciding the case when “there is not a scintilla of evidence that a code violation occurred.” Hey, guys, where’s the love?
This isn’t the first time the court’s confronted a question about the effect of administrative regs on the open and obvious doctrine; last year, it had another case on that exact issue, involving the death of a 10-year-old girl in a hotel swimming pool. (You can find a fairly extensive discussion of the issues in my post here.) So what happened? The court dismissed that one as improvidently allowed, too.
In the only other case (besides a tax appeal), the court held in State v. Bartholomew that a trial court can order a defendant to pay restitution to the victim’s reparations fund.
Courts of appeals don’t have the luxury of being able to dodge cases, so let’s see what happened there….
Civil. 1st District joins 5th and 10th Districts in holding that employer’s allegation that employee fraudulently obtained workers comp benefits is appealable under RC 4123.512; 2nd and 11th Districts have held to the contrary… The 6th District tells us all, for the 486th time, that (a) there is no such thing as a motion for reconsideration in the trial court, and (b) a motion to vacate cannot be used as a substitute for appeal… 8th District says that doctor not entitled to set-off from plaintiff’s settlement with hospital, set-off allowed only where settling co-defendant is found to be “liable in tort”… Good discussion in this 6th District case of factors to be considered in granting change of name of child… 12th District upholds arbitration provision in contract for nursing home care…
Criminal. 8th District, in post-Colon decision, says that aggravated robbery with a gun doesn’t require a mens rea… 4th District looks at post-Foster sentencing law on standard of review and concludes that appellate must review sentence to determine whether court considered statutory sentencing factors; if it did, then sentence is reviewed for abuse of discretion… 9th District reverses rape conviction because of impermissible use of pre-arrest, post-Miranda silence, on plain error analysis, no less…
Beavis and Butthead would have a field day with this one. In State v. Lang, the 8th District reviewed a conviction for disseminating matter harmful to juveniles, which provides that “no person *** shall recklessly exhibit, or present to a juvenile *** any material or performance that is obscene or harmful to juveniles.” The court determined that evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant based upon its previous holding that “masturbating in front of juveniles constitutes a ‘performance.’”



August 25th, 2008 at 8:07 am
I wonder if there’s any sense of shame in waiting this long to IA this case. (My guess is a resounding “No”.) IA’ing a case reflects not only on the Court’s work ethic, but on its competence as an institution. Why wasn’t this issue vetted during the jurisdictional phase? If you read both the trial and appellate decisions in AK Steel, for example, both courts assumed a violation of the administrative regulation. It should’ve been noted, right at the outset, that the case had been decided without any determination regarding an actual breach of the regulation.
Moreover, I’m not sure why the Court can’t simply assume a violation and reach the legal question. The factual matter was certainly contested, even at the Supreme Court level; but if legal grounds would preclude relief regardless of an actual breach, why not decide it now? Must parties go through the rigmarole of discovery when, in fact, the plaintiff might be legally unable to recover? Notice how Justice O’Connor’s opinion gives an awful lot of credence to AK Steel’s experts, which she argues shows that no breach occurred. Doesn’t that strike you as inappropriate?
August 25th, 2008 at 9:32 am
Yes, there was credence given to the experts, but the plaintiff also had to show there were genuine issues of material fact. The plaintiff just can’t say, “The defense expert is wrong,” or, “Because we say there’s a breach, there’s a breach.” Thus, if the only evidence is the defense expert, how should that evidence be construed?
August 25th, 2008 at 12:14 pm
I think this resulted from one of the problems with the “arguendo” assumption: rather than addressing whether the evidence actually showed a safety violation, both of the lower courts didn’t address that issue, instead going straight for the question of whether the danger was open and obvious. Neither of the jurisdictional memoranda really argued the issue strongly; it wasn’t until the appellee’s merit brief that the company really made a big deal about it.
Actually, I think this case says more about some of the problems with the open and obvious doctrine, and the courts’ increasing willingness to use summary judgment to decide factual issues, than it does about the Supreme Court’s IA policies.
August 25th, 2008 at 12:33 pm
I agree.
August 25th, 2008 at 6:25 pm
I also agree. Though it doesn’t excuse the fact that it took the Court this long to IA the case.
August 26th, 2008 at 7:54 am
On the face, I’d say you’re right, with the caveat that we aren’t privy to the inner workings, so we don’t know if the Court as a whole is to blame for the delay or if an individual justice was the cause.