Nude photography and cussing out the police
If you're thinking of pinning any future disciplinary transgressions on the old "sexual addiction" defense, be forewarned: the Supreme Court ain't buyin' it. The other day they suspended the "Naked Photographer," an attorney who wound up pleading guilty to 53 counts of sexual imposition and public indecency, resulting from his practice of accosting women while he was naked and taking a picture of their reaction to him. He also acknowledged that he'd touched several of the women, and that "maybe" he'd masturbated in front of the first couple of victims. (What, you'd forget something like that?) He brought in a note from his doctor saying that his conduct was the result of a "sexual addiction," but wound up with a two-year suspension anyway.
The most sobering part of the story was that "while engaging in these activities, respondent was employed by the Speaker of the Ohio House of Representatives as Legal Counsel for Taxation and Education." Thomas Jefferson thought we should have a revolution every couple of generations. I think we're overdue.
The 2nd District recently reversed a conviction for intimidation where the defendant "made certain reprehensible statements to the arresting officer threatening physical violence," concluding that the comments weren't meant to intimidate but were merely "an expression of fury at his being arrested." I've had a number of disorderly conduct cases involving comments made to a police officer, and it's really amazing what you can get away with saying to a cop. A good review of the do's and don'ts can be found in this 8th District case from 1993. That's hardly an exhaustive list; what's proper etiquette when berating a police officer is decided, as we say in the law biz, on a case by case basis, and sometimes there's not a lot of logic in it. You can find cases holding that calling officers "a bunch of fucking idiots" isn't punishable, and other cases holding that saying they're on the take is.
Finally, there's another 2nd District case which held that a judge abused his discretion in denying a defendant's motion for treatment in lieu of conviction, on the grounds that defendant had a previous misdemeanor conviction. Essentially, according to the court, if the defendant meets the nine criteria in RC 2951.041(B), the court has to grant the motion, and if he doesn't, the court has to deny it. Not sure I buy it -- basically, that leaves the judge with no discretion, and that's not the reading I get from the statute -- but it could be helpful. As I mentioned a few months ago, there are advantages to using treatment in lieu instead of the prosecutor's Early Intervention Program.
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