An interesting case came down last week that could have major ramifications on the way expert testimony is prepared.  The plaintiffs’ experts in a wrongful death case were deposed, and testified that they discussed their findings with a nurse-paralegal working for the plaintiffs’ attorney, who then prepared a report which the experts signed.  Could the defense use that as a justification to take the deposition of the nurse-paralegal? (more…)

A gorgeous Sunday morning, marred only by the news of an outbreak of bird flu in Parma.  On to the law….

Location, location, location.  Every criminal defense attorney knows that the Cleveland Police Department subscribes to Tuco’s Law of Human Dichotomies in believing that there are two kinds of people in this world: those who live in “high crime areas,” and those who don’t, the former group coinciding fairly precisely with the population of the City of Cleveland.

Fortunately, it hasn’t spread to the suburbs, at least according to the court in Euclid v. Favors, which involved the propriety of a stop and frisk by a Euclid policeman.  (more…)

The “wet basement” case — every lawyer’s favorite — is the subject in Zappitelli v. Miller.  The plaintiffs had shelled out over half a million dollars for the property, only to find a week later that the basement was flooded and that the land around the house looked like the set of Waterworld.  To top it off, the plaintiffs learned that a few days before the sale, the defendants had been told of the presence of active mold in the basement, but kinda forgot to put that on the disclosure form.  The plaintiffs sued, and were awarded $134,000 in damages for fraud, negligence, and breach of contract.  The defendants appealed the verdict, and the plaintiffs cross-appealed on the denial of their request to rescind the contract, and of attorney fees.

The court rejected the defendants’ arguments, which challenged the verdict, then turned to the cross-appeal.  It held that rescission wasn’t an available remedy because the disclosure statute, RC 5302.30(K), essentially prohibits rescission as long as the seller provides the required disclosure form.  (more…)

Spruced up the site a bit.  I also turned on the comments, so you can respond to any of the posts, and you can also drop me a line if you’d like.

The police set up a buy of five ounces of crack, and when the deal goes down, they wind up with 130 grams of baking soda for their troubles. Can the seller be given an additional ten-year sentence as a major drug offender?

To the average person, that question might have a certain Alice in Wonderland quality about it, but it’s always been the law that one can be convicted of offering to sell drugs even when the “drugs” are bogus. (In fact, the Court ruled back in 1987 in State v. Mughni, 33 Ohio St. 3d 65, that offering to sell drugs which turned out to be fake and selling counterfeit substances under RC 2925.37(B) weren’t allied offenses: a defendant could be convicted of both.)  But in a case decided yesterday, the Supreme Court rules that some measurable quantity of an actual controlled substance has to be present in order to impose the MDO penalties.

The court reverses a conviction in State v. Strowder because the trial court didn’t permit defense counsel to cross-examine the co-defendant, who’d copped a plea and was testifying for the state, about the potential penalty he’d faced if he hadn’t worked out a deal. Howard, the co-defendant, was facing 100 years, and wound up with eight after a plea. The state argued that what Howard could actually get was irrelevant; the proper focus was on what Howard believed he was facing. While that argument is correct – the co-defendant’s subjective belief is the relevant inquiry for bias – the court found that Howard’s equivocations about how many counts he was looking at warranted full cross-examination as to the penalties.